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CONSUMER PROTECTION: JUDICIAL
APPROACHES TO RESCISSION AND
RESTORATION UNDER THE TRUTH
IN LENDING ACT
In 1968, Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act' to protect
consumers by requiring creditors2 to disclose certain credit terms 3 to
borrowers4 in a consistent and uniform manner. 5 The Federal Reserve
Board has implemented the Act by promulgating Regulation Z, which
prescribes both the substance and form of credit disclosures. 6 The Act
1. The Truth in Lending Act is Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1601-1662 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970) authorizes
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to implement the Act by pro-
mulgating regulations. These regulations, known collectively as Regulation Z, are
codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1977).
2. The Act requires disclosure by those "who regularly extend, or arrange for the
extension of, credit which is payable by agreement in more than four installments or
for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required, whether in connec-
tion with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f)
(Supp. V 1975). In general, courts have broadly interpreted the term "creditor," mak-
ing the requirements of the Act widely applicable. See, e.g., Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc.,
495 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 1974) (realtor extending credit to customers in nearly
half its sales is "creditor" within meaning of Act); Lauletta v. Valley Buick, Inc., 421
F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (automobile dealer providing credit to automobile
buyer is "creditor" subject to the Act's disclosure requirements).
3. In general, creditors must disclose the costs of credit, including the dollar amount
of finance charge, the annual rate of finance charge, and other relevant charges. 12
C.F.R. § 226.1(a)(2) (1977). Required disclosures differ slightly according to the
nature of the transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (open end credit
plans); 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1970) (sales under other than an open end credit plan);
15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1970) (loans under other than an open end credit plan).
4. The provisions of the Act are intended to benefit only natural persons to whom
credit is offered or extended "primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural
purposes." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970). Credit arrangements for business or com-
mercial purposes are exempt, as are non-real property transactions where the amount
financed exceeds $25,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (1970). See, e.g., Adema v. Great N. Dev.
Co., 374 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (purchaser of recreational property for in-
vestment purposes is not a consumer within the meaning of the Act).
5. Congress summarized this general purpose of the Act as follows:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the com-
petition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the ex-
tension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by con-
sumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the
various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
6. The Act specifies what information shall be disclosed, and Regulation Z details
the form to be followed in making disclosures. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1977);
see, e.g., LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1976) (creditor violated
the Act by failing to clearly delineate required disclosures from other information
provided which was not required).
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was intended to alleviate public confusion resulting from inconsistent
creditor disclosure practices. 7 This goal was to be accomplished by
providing consumers with the credit information necessary to make
reasoned decisions. Moreover, Congress envisioned that competition
among creditors would be strengthened by enabling consumers to
make comparisons and shop for favorable credit terms.
Now, a decade later, both consumer protection advocates and
creditors believe that the Act, as written and implemented, is not
achieving its stated objectives. 8 Proponents are concerned that the dis-
closures required are so complex that their impact on consumer credit
decisions is negligible.9 Creditors find it difficult to comply with the
regulations and complain of being subjected to needless litigation for
harmless violations of the Act. 10
Because of the intricacy of the statutory provisions and administra-
tive regulations, courts have had to struggle, first, to define what con-
stitutes a violation,1' and then to apply the appropriate remedial
provisions of the Act.12 One remedial provision presenting particular
7. Prior to adoption of the Act, creditors calculated finance charges by a variety of
methods. Some used a monthly rate, and others based the charge on the original
rather than the declining balance of the obligation. Still others added incidental fees
and charges to the basic finance charge, and some informed the consumer of only the
dollar cost of credit without reference to rate. [ 1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1962, 1970.
8. For a good general discussion of the call for reform of the Act, see 26 CATH.
U.L. REV. 575 (1977).
9. Senator Proxmire, original sponsor of the Act, remarked: "I doubt that many
consumers take the time to wade through all the information provided. The essential
items ... are lost amid dozens of other numbers, computations and notices." Truth in
Lending Act Needs Comprehensive Overhauling, Says Proxmire, 31 PERSONAL FINANCE
L.Q. REP. 16, 16 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Proxmire Remarks]. See Warren, Con-
sumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs, and Benefits, 27 STAN. L. REV. 951, 962-63 & n.72
(1975) (there is no compelling evidence borrowers do more comparative shopping
for credit than they did before adoption of the Act).
10. See Halverson, Has truth-in-lending legislation gone too far?, The Christian
Science Monitor, Oct. 17, 1977, at B8, col. 1; Proxmire Remarks, supra note 9; 26
CATH. U.L. REV. 575, 579 (1977).
11. A good example of the protracted litigation that has ensued under some pro-
visions is the question of when and how acceleration clauses should be disclosed. For
a summary of the judicial approaches to this problem, see 46 CIN. L. REV. 284,
285-87 (1977).
12. Congress designed a broad enforcement scheme to ensure creditor compliance
with the disclosure requirements of the Act. Section 1640 provides a mechanism for
private enforcement. An aggrieved borrower may recover actual damages and twice
the amount of any finance charge. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. V 1975). In addition,
administrative enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission is authorized by 15
U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1970), and criminal sanctions may be imposed for wilful and
knowing violations of the Act under 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970). See Comment.
The Truth in Lending Act: A Summary of the Consumer's Remedies, 22 S.D.L. REV.
302
Vol. 53: 301, 1978
Truth in Lending
interpretive difficulties is section 1635,13 which enables the borrower
to rescind certain loan transactions in which his home has been en-
cumbered. Some courts do not require the borrower to restore the
creditor following rescission; 14 others find mutual restoration to be a
statutory requisite.15 This comment will describe the statutory scheme
for rescission and restoration, identify where and why interpretive
problems arise, summarize the judicial approaches to these problems,
and analyze those approaches in relation to the stated purposes of the
Act.
I. STATUTORY RESCISSION AND RESTORATION
A. The Rescission Provision: Subsection 1635(a)
Subsection 1635(a) applies to loan transactions in which the credi-
tor retains a security interest' 6 other than a first lien' 7 on the bor-
rower's principal residence. 18 It gives an absolute right to rescind for
three business days following finalization of the transaction; the right
continues thereafter for three years if the creditor fails to make any
material disclosure, 19 including disclosure of the right of rescission.
Rescission under subsection 1635(a) should not be confused with
322 (1977) (availability and effectiveness of Act's provisions). See also Boyd, The
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act-A Consumer Perspective, 45 NoTRE DAME
LAW. 171, 182-85 (1970).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (b) (Supp. V 1975).
14. Courts taking this position are herein referred to as the literalists. See Part
II-A infra.
15. These courts are herein referred to as the discretionists. See Part I-B infra.
16. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(gg) (1977) defines "security" and "security interest" as
"any interest in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
But see Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1976) (creditor
does not obtain a security interest when a confession of judgment is contained in a
chattel mortgage); Mims v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ga. 1976)
(assignment and waiver of homestead does not create a iecurity interest).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e) (Supp. V 1975).
18. For a discussion of when rescissionary relief is available under the Act, see
Griffith, Truth-in-Lending and Real Estate Transactions: Some Aspects, 2 Ono N. L.
REv. 1 (1974).
19. The courts have rarely questioned whether a creditor's violation is "material"
because ordinarily borrowers rescind when creditors have made multiple violations of
the Act. Nonetheless, there is a largely undefined area of "immaterial" violations which
will not justify an act of rescission. See, e.g., Ivey v. United States Dept. of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 428 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ga. 1977), in which the creditor miscalculated
the total amount financed by $11.30. The court held that the violation "was not a
'material' non-disclosure," establishing the test that a violation which would not be of
significance to a reasonable consumer comparison shopping for credit will not justify
an act of rescission. Id. at 1343.
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nonstatutory rescission, which requires as a condition that the re-
scinding party tender restitution. 20 By the terms of the Act, the bor-
rower may rescind merely by giving notice to the creditor, 21 where-
upon he is absolved of further obligation under the transaction and "is
not liable for any finance or other charge. ' 22 Thus, termination of the
borrower's contractual obligations through rescission is both a remedy
and a method for privately enforcing the disclosure requirements of
the Act. The noncomplying creditor risks losing his expected return
on the loan and having to bear the administrative costs of the transac-
tion. In the event of court action to enforce rescission, the creditor
also will incur litigation expenses. In addition, the creditor may con-
currently be liable for civil damages. 23 If he should lose the civil suit,
the statute requires him to pay the borrower's reasonable attorney's
fees. Courts have also awarded attorney's fees to borrowers who suc-
cessfully sue to enforce rescission.24
20. Nonstatutory abrogation of an agreement may take the form of legal rescis-
sion or equitable discharge, but either theory requires the rescinding party to make
restitution. 12 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1454, at 10 (3d ed. 1970). The mechanics
of completing rescission and restitution vary, however, with the theory of relief. At
law, rescission is accomplished by act of the parties upon notice and tender of restitu-
tion by the rescinding party, whereas, in equity, the court determines whether to dis-
charge the contract and ensures restitution for both parties as a condition of its order.
See Dobbs, Pressing Problems for the Plaintiff's Lawyer in Rescission: Election of
Remedies and Restoration of Consideration, 26 ARK. L. REV. 322, 341-46 (1972).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (Supp. V 1975). The Board requires the creditor to pro-
vide the obligor written notice of the right to rescind. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(b) (1977).
Thereafter, an obligor electing to rescind must give written notice to the creditor, but
need not state grounds for election. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) (1977). But see Powers v.
Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1220 (4th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff's notice of rescission
held to be invalid when accompanied by indication of unwillingness to make restitu-
tion).
22. The effect of rescission under § 1635(a) is stated in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b)
(Supp. V 1975).
23. There has been controversy over whether a civil award under § 1640 and
rescission under § 1635 present independent or mutually exclusive remedies. Some
courts have held that the sections are inconsistent remedial provisions requiring the
borrower to elect his remedy. See Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio
1970), in which a creditor acquired a security interest as part of an agreement to in-
stall a swimming pool. When the borrower sought both to rescind and to recover civil
damages, the court held the election of remedies doctrine to be applicable. The Su-
preme Court has, however, referred to § 1640 as a penal provision. Mourning v.
Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 375 (1973) (dictum) (the Act should
not be narrowly construed simply because it contains provisions for civil and criminal
penalties). Lower courts have relied on the Court's dictum to hold that since the civil
liability provision is penal, the election of remedies doctrine is inapplicable and bor-
rowers may seek to rescind and recover civil damages. See Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc.,
495 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1974) (both remedies are available for admitted creditor
violations of the Act). See also Note, Truth In Lending Act Litigation: Concurrent
Recourse to Rescission and the Civil Penalty, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 840, 846-69
(1975).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975) entitles a consumer seeking civil
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B. Restoration Following Rescission: Subsection 1635(b)
Subsection 1635(b) details the performances necessary to complete
restoration after the borrower has rescinded.25 Upon rescission, resti-
tution for the borrower is partially accomplished because the credi-
tor's security interest becomes void.26 Following rescission, the
creditor must return any money or property received from the bor-
rower, and take the steps necessary to reflect termination of his securi-
ty interest.27 When the creditor's security interest has been recorded,
these further steps are necessary to restore the borrower completely;
title to the borrower's property may remain clouded until the public
record reflects termination of the security interest.28 Once the creditor
has cleared title, the borrower is then required to tender back the con-
sideration received-whether money or property29-- or its reasonable
value.30 The creditor must then take possession of the tendered con-
damages to reasonable attorney's fees; however, the Act makes no corresponding
provision for consumers seeking to enforce the right of rescission. Nonetheless, most
courts have awarded attorney's fees to rescinding plaintiffs on the theory that §
1640(a)(3), which authorizes attorney's fees "in the case of any successful action to
enforce the foregoing liability," refers to actions for nondisclosure violations, and is
therefore broad enough to encompass rescissionary actions. See, e.g., James v. Ragin,
432 F. Supp. 887, 894 (W.D.N.C. 1977); Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp.
773, 778-79 (W.D. La. 1975).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (Supp. V 1975) is entitled "Return of money or property
following rescission," and requires each party to tender back consideration according
to the procedure specified therein.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Technically, as regards the creditor's security interest, restitution for the bor-
rower occurs when the security becomes void upon rescission. Still, the documents
that created the interest remain, and the statute requires the creditor to make the
public records reflect termination of that security interest. Until the documents are
terminated, the borrower's title to the property may remain clouded. See, e.g., _jepava
v. M.L.S.C. Properties, Inc., 511 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1975) (rescinding borrowers had
difficulty selling property subject to lender's void security interest). The term "restora-
tion," as distinct from restitution, will be used herein to refer generally to whatever
steps are necessary to put the parties in the position each would have occupied had
the original transaction never occurred.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (Supp. V 1975).
30. Id. The rescission provision of the Act applies to two general types of con-
sumer credit transactions. The borrower may obtain a second mortgage loan and use
the proceeds for investment or other purposes, in which case the Act would require
the borrower to tender back the money advanced by the creditor. See, e.g., Palmer v.
Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1974) (the court remanded, directing the
lower court to devise a repayment plan whereby the borrower could return the pro-
ceeds of the second mortgage loan). A requirement that the borrower tender back
consideration given may, however, be impractical or inequitable when the borrower
has entered into a home improvement type loan. In such case, tender back of the
reasonable value of the property purchased would be permissible.
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sideration within ten days or forfeit it to the borrower.3' By this statu-
tory process, both parties are ultimately returned to the status quo
ante.
C. Interpretation of Subsections 1635(a) and (b)
Interpretation and enforcement of subsections 1635(a) and (b)
present difficulties because the courts must define and assume a judi-
cial role for which Congress did not provide. 32 Subsection 1635(b) di-
rects each party to restore the other following rescission, suggesting
that the provision will be self-enforcing. Examination of the typical
fact patterns prompting subsection 1635(b) litigation, however, illus-
trates why judicial enforcement is often necessary. Although statutori-
ly obligated to clear title to the borrower's property following rescis-
sion, creditors are often reluctant to do so. The creditor who asserts a
good faith defense to the borrower's act of rescission will claim that
she is by reason of that defense under no obligation to make restora-
tion as required by subsection 1635(b). 33 More generally, the creditor
will not clear title because the rescinding borrower ordinarily is un-
able to make full and immediate repayment of the loan proceeds. 34
The creditor may even have specific indications of the borrower's lia-
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (Supp. V 1975).
32. Subsection 1635(b) "contemplates an orderly progression of specific events"
whereby the parties exchange consideration received. Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 118
(5th Cir. 1974). It does not provide for judicial intervention. Presumably, had Con-
gress expected § 1635(b) to produce court actions, it would have included provision
for a judicial role. See Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 773, 779 (W.D. La.
1975) (the court noted that there is no convincing evidence that Congress contem-
plated litigation under the provision). The attempt to extrapolate congressional intent
is a particularly imprecise endeavor here where the Act as initially proposed did not
mention rescission. An amendment provided for a three day notice before execution
period, see 114 CONG. REc. 1611 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Cahill), and a conference
committee appointed to reconcile House and Senate differences included in its report
a rescission provision requiring contemporaneous acts of restoration by both parties.
[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2021, 2023. As finally enacted, the borrower's
obligation to make restitution does not arise until the creditor's concomitant obligation
has been fulfilled. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (Supp. V 1975). For a thorough discussion
of the interpretive difficulties surrounding the rescission provision arising from the
scant indicators of congressional intent, see Note, supra note 23, at 842-43.
33. The borrower may rescind by notifying the creditor, and need not state
grounds justifying that act. See note 21 supra. Unless the act of rescission is valid,
the creditor is not correspondingly bound to make restitution. This is the position of
creditors asserting defenses to alleged violations of the Act. See, e.g., LaGrone v.
Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976) (creditor claimed that disclosures of an ac-
celeration clause and the amount financed were adequate).
34. A recent survey of plaintiffs' attorneys showed that about one-half of the bor-
rowers bringing claims under the Act sought legal assistance simply because they were
306
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bility or unwillingness to tender back consideration.3 5 Fearing that
the loan proceeds will be unrecoverable, the creditor attempts to en-
sure recovery by retaining her security interest despite the borrower's
act of rescission.
If the creditor fails to clear title to the borrower's property, the res-
cinding borrower may request the court to make the public record re-
flect termination of the security interest voided by the rescission.36
This result can be accomplished judicially through issuance of a ter-
mination order that has the effect of cancelling the operative docu-
ments.37
If the court does no more than issue a termination order, the bor-
rower is fully restored, but the creditor may well be left without
practical means of obtaining restitution of money or property trans-
ferred.38 If the court refuses to issue such an order,3 9 the creditor's
unable to pay the debt. Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 U.
ILL. L.F. 669, 677.
Courts have also noted that rescinding borrowers are often unable to make full
restoration immediately. See, e.g., Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862-63 (9th Cir.
1974) (the court remanded, stating that a repayment plan consistent with the borrow-
er's current financial situation might be devised). In dissent, Judge Wright also indi-
cated that borrowers will commonly be unable to make immediate restoration. Id. at
864. One explanation for the borrower's inability to make repayment is that in the
cases reported, rescission occurred long after the borrower had expended or trans-
formed the loan proceeds. See, e.g., Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 116-17 (5th Cir.
1974) (rescission occurred approximately two years after the parties entered into the
transaction); cf. Strader v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 551 P.2d 720, 722 (Colo. 1976) (rescis-
sion permitted under state Uniform Consumer Credit Code when borrower rescinded
eleven months after consumation of the transaction).
35. See Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1220 (4th Cir. 1976) (bulk of
the loan proceeds were used to discharge existing indebtedness, and the court found
that the rescinding plaintiff specifically expressed unwillingness to tender back con-
sideration); LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976) (creditor instigated
foreclosure proceedings because borrower had defaulted on two identical loan agree-
ments; borrower rescinded, and the court found that the rescission was an attempt to
extricate herself from her obligations).
36. The courts uniformly refer to the cases arising under § 1635(b) as actions
for rescission. See, e.g., Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974). As provided
in § 1635(a), however, rescission occurs upon notice by the borrower before the
court is consulted. See note 21 supra. All contractual obligations are terminated upon
notice, and the court is petitioned only for full restoration following rescission.
37. The court will issue whatever order is necessary to reflect termination of the
voided security interest and fully restore the borrower to the status quo ante. The
court may issue a termination order which also requires the borrower to restore the
creditor.
38. Restitution may be unavailable simply because borrowers are unable to repay
the debt immediately. See note 34 and accompanying text supra. If the court does not
enter judgment for the creditor in the amount of the loan proceeds, she cannot attach
any assets the borrower might have.
In addition, if the federal court does not ensure restoration for the creditor, she
may not have a state forum in which to assert her claim. The creditor's interest in
307
Washington Law Review
voided security interest is effectively reinstated40 and the lender may
then attempt to enforce it to obtain immediate restoration. 41 In that
case, however, the borrower has not been restored, because the securi-
ty interest taken incident to the rescinded transaction has been given
renewed validity. Thus, the court cannot ensure immediate restora-
tion for both parties by issuing or denying a termination order.
When litigation occurs, courts must recognize that immediate res-
toration of both the creditor and the borrower may be mutually
exclusive objectives. Some courts, interpreting the statute literally, or-
der termination, but do not require the borrower then to restore the
creditor. 42 Other courts invoke discretion43 to achieve a result conso-
nant with nonstatutory rules governing rescission 44 by ensuring some
measure of deferred restoration45 for both parties following rescis-
sion. The remainder of this comment examines these two lines of judi-
cial reasoning, and concludes that the discretionary approach better
fulfills congressional purposes.
restitution may be characterized as a compulsory counterclaim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 13(a). Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1974) (Wright,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). If so, the creditor will later be barred
from raising the issue. See 17 HUGHES FEDERAL PRACTICE JURISDICTION & PROCEDURE §
20572 (1940).
State court relief has also been denied the creditor on the theory that since the con-
tract has been rescinded, the creditor cannot recover on a "void, annuled obligation."
Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 773, 778 (W.D. La. 1975). There is little
support for the court's reasoning in Burley because a creditor's interest in restitution
is quasi-contractual or equitable, but not contractual, therefore the creditor was not
attempting to recover on the original obligation.
39. No court has refused to issue a termination order, but the discretionist courts,
most notably in the Ninth Circuit, have issued termination orders contingent upon
repayment of the loan proceeds. See Part II-B infra.
40. If the documents reflecting the security interest remain intact, it is for all
practical purposes reinstated, because title to the borrower's property remains clouded
and all parties dealing with respect to that property will act as if the interest remained
valid. Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir. 1974) (Wright, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
41. The phrase "immediate restoration" for the creditor refers to any means
whereby the creditor may be able to recover the entire amount of the loan proceeds
at one time following rescission. A reinstated security interest may allow the creditor
to do this. See note 40 supra. Immediate restoration for the borrower refers to the
unconditional termination of all evidence of the lender's security interest following
rescission. See notes 28 & 37 supra.
42. See Part II-A infra.
43. See Part II-B infra.
44. See note 20 supra.
45. Deferred restoration results when a party may ultimately be fully restored, but
restoration is contingent or completed over time. When the borrower repays the loan
proceeds over a period of time, the creditor receives deferred rather than immediate
restoration. Similarly, the borrower receives only deferred restoration when the lend-
er's security interest is reinstated until the full amount has been repaid.
308
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II. THE LITERALIST AND DISCRETIONIST
INTERPRETATIONS OF SUBSECTION 1635(b)
A. The Literalist Approach
When the creditor fails to clear title following rescission, subsection
1635(b), read literally, seems to require the court to order termination
and leave the borrower's obligation to make restoration unenforced. 46
Issuing the order is necessary to restore the borrower immediately. 47
The statute, however, requires the creditor to provide restoration as a
condition precedent to the borrower's reciprocal obligation. 48 Techni-
cally, the condition is not fulfilled by the court's order of termination.
Thus, unless the creditor clears title, literalist reasoning dictates that
the borrower's obligation to repay is excused. 49
Literalist reasoning differs somewhat when the borrower offers res-
toration upon giving notice of rescission, or indicates a willingness to
do So. 5 0 Here, the borrower's offer of restoration is considered equiva-
lent to actual statutory tender. When the borrower has made statutory
tender, ordinarily after the creditor has cleared title, subsection
1635(b) directs the creditor to take possession of the profferred con-
sideration within ten days or forfeit it to the borrower. The literalist
court considers the borrower's willingness to make restoration suffi-
cient in itself to activate this forfeiture clause, leaving the creditor
46. A number of courts have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Sosa v. Fite, 498
F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974); Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. La.
1975); cf. Strader v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 551 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1976) (enforcing a res-
cission provision under the state Uniform Consumer Credit Code, modeled on the
federal provision).
47. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
48. Subsection 1635(b) reads in pertinent part: "Upon the performance of the
creditor's obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the
creditor." 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
49. In Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. La. 1975), the
court ordered termination, but did not require the borrower to make restitution. The
court stated: "Because [the creditor] chose not to respond within ten days of the
date upon which the plaintiffs rescinded the transaction, tender by the plaintiffs of
the loan proceeds . . . was, therefore, not required." Id. at 191. See also Powers v.
Sims & Levin Realtors, 396 F. Supp. 12, 25-26 (E.D. Va. 1975) (creditor must clear
title as a condition precedent to borrower's obligation to make restitution, and the
borrower is excused from tendering back when the condition is not met), rev'd, 542
F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976) (there is no condition precedent to clear title when it is
clear that the borrower does not intend to repay).
50. See, e.g., Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974) (borrower's notice of
rescission was accompanied by an express offer of restoration, and the court construed
the offer as equivalent to statutory tender, concluding that, as a result, the forfeiture
clause of § 1635(b) was activated).
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with no statutorily enforceable right to restoration after the ten days
have expired. 51
Literalists concede that either the excuse or forfeiture analysis gen-
erally renders the creditor unable to recover the loan proceeds. 52
These courts reason that this result is harmonious with the broad con-
gressional goals of providing debtor protection and encouraging
creditor compliance with the terms of the Act.5 3 In their view, when
the parties fail to comply with subsection 1635(b) directives, an un-
conditional termination order is proper because it fully protects the
borrower's property from the threat of foreclosure by a creditor who
acquired a security interest without making full disclosures. 54 If the
creditor is then faced with a potential loss of consideration, she will
have an incentive to clear title to the borrower's property as required
by subsection 1635(b). In this way, the literalist interpretation en-
courages creditor compliance with the terms of the Act and thereby
promotes the informed use of consumer credit.55
Courts adopting the literalist approach recognize that the result is
incongruous with traditional rules of rescission and restitution, and al-
so with one objective of subsection 1635(b)-ultimately to return both
parties to the status quo ante. These courts reason, however, that this
result occurs only when the creditor has frustrated the statutory
51. Some courts have adopted the forfeiture theory when there was no evidence
of the borrower's willingness to tender back. See Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411
F. Supp. 176, 191 (E.D. La. 1975); Powers v. Sims & Levin Realtors, 396 F. Supp.
12, 25-26 (E.D. Va. 1975) (the court explicated both the excuse and forfeiture
theories), rev'd, 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976).
52. See, e.g., Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1974) (Wright, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411 F.
Supp. 176, 191 (E.D. La. 1975).
53. Although the courts split as to whether a literalist or discretionist approach to
the statute is proper, substantially all commentators support the literalist reading and
contend that the use of discretion contravenes the protective intent of the legislation.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 23, at 846; Note, Truth-In-Lending: Judicial Modification
of the Right of Rescission, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1227; 48 CoLo. L. REv. 437 (1977).
54. Judge Wright has best explicated the literalist interpretation. He reasoned that
any termination order which does not entirely unburden the borrower of the effect of
the security interest contravenes the purpose of the provision. Palmer v. Wilson, 502
F.2d 860, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1974) (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See generally 114 CONG. REc. 1611 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Cahill).
55. One court wrote:
We hold that this statutory provision is intended as an impetus for the creditor
to take immediate action to clear title and to fulfill its obligations. If not inter-
preted in this way, there is no stimulus for the creditor to comply with the statu-
tory provisions requiring him to release the security interests within the ten day
period.
Strader v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 551 P.2d 720, 725 (Colo. 1976).
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scheme by failing to perform as required by subsection 1635(b).56
They would conclude that this result is not unduly harsh because the
creditor can avoid the loss of consideration by clearing title as re-
quired.
B. The Discretionist Approach
Some courts find the literalist result unpalatable. They enforce sub-
section 1635(b) by invoking discretion57 to balance the equities of the
case in view of the legislative policy concerns underlying the Act58 and
the general restorative aim of subsection 1635(b).59 In the context of
this provision, the most important legislative policy concern is to pro-
tect the borrower's property from foreclosure by a creditor who
gained a security interest without making the required disclosures. 60 A
56. Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1974) (Wright, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1974);
Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 176, 191 (E.D. La. 1275).
57. Although the discretionist approach has garnered some support, courts exer-
cising discretion have evoked judicial dissent and critical commentary. See, e.g.,
Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976) (Winter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 863-64 (9th Cir.
1974) (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Note, Truth-In-Lending:
Judicial Modification of the Right of Rescission, 1974 DUKE LJ. 1227, 1241; Note,
supra note 23, at 846. The criticism is largely deserved, not because the discretionist
position is unsound, but because judicial articulation of the discretionist.approach has
been incomplete, conceptually confusing, and consequently susceptible to attack. The
courts use the phrase "conditional rescission" when "conditional termination" apparent-
ly is intended. For example, in LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976),
the court properly referred to the district court's failure to "condition cancellation,"
but then stated that the issue on appeal was whether to "condition rescission." The
distinction is vital, because rescission occurs upon notice under § 1635(a), and if the
court determines that the creditor has indeed violated the Act, the borrower was en-
titled to rescind. Thereafter, the use of discretion is relevant only to the issue of how
to enforce the restitutionary provisions of § 1635(b) following rescission.
58. The propriety of the court's order "of course will depend on the equities
present in a particular case, as well as consideration of the legislative policy of full
disclosure ... and the remedial-penal nature of the private enforcement provisions of
the Act." Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 1974).
59. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reasons that the effect of rescis-
sion is to absolve the borrower of the obligation to pay finance or other charges, but
that it does not relieve him of the duty to make restoration. Rather, § 1635(b) re-
quires the borrower to fulfill that obligation. Thus, § 1635(b) and traditional equitable
concepts both result in the restoration of each party, and thereby require judicial
enforcement of the borrower's obligation to make restoration. Powers v. Sims & Levin,
542 F.2d 1216, 1220-22 (4th Cir. 1976).
60. Congress expressed particular concern for the potentially grave eventuality of
home foreclosure that can result when the creditor takes a security interest and the
borrower does not perform as contractually obligated. 114 CONG. REC. 1611 (1968)(remarks of Rep. Cahill). Under the statute, if the borrower was not informed of es-
sential credit terms, especially the taking of the security interest, she could resort to
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discretionist court, after finding that a material violation of the Act
validates the borrower's rescission, would consider the following
factual variables before ordering restoration for either party: (1)
whether the creditor asserted a good faith defense to the borrower's
act of rescission; 6' (2) of what significance the creditor's violation
would be to a reasonable consumer, comparison-shopping for cred-
it;62 (3) whether the borrower indicated either willingness or ability to
repay the loan proceeds; 63 and (4) whether other means of enforcing
creditor compliance are available. 64
Under this balancing approach, 65 a court can order uncondition-
the remedy of rescission. The taking of a security interest is itself an important credit
term. Congress was specifically concerned about creditors who may exact securities
from borrowers in second mortgage transactions in which the atmosphere may be
hurried and the borrower does not realize that a security interest will be taken in his
home as an incident of the transaction. Id.
61. A good faith defense will not invalidate the borrower's act of rescission if a
material violation by the creditor is found. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
Nevertheless, the defense would be an equitable consideration in the discretionist bal-
ancing. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra for an explanation of why a
creditor might fail to clear title under § 1635(b) following the borrower's rescission.
62. The importance of this factor is that it indicates the relative significance of the
policy concern for protecting the uninformed borrower. See note 60 supra. Addition-
ally, this factor, in conjunction with evidence of the borrower's willingness or ability
to tender back, see note 63 infra, can help to expose the borrower who, unharmed by
the creditor's violation, is attempting to escape both his contractual and restorative
obligations.
63. Like the assertion of a good faith defense, this factor can help to explain
whether the creditor had any justification for refusing to clear title. See Powers v.
Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976), in which the court stated that "surely
the Congress did not intend to require a lender to relinquish its security interest when
it is now known that the borrowers did not intend and were not prepared to tender
restitution." Id. at 1221.
64. The lender should not escape without liability for his violation. Powers v.
Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976). The concern, however, is that
the loss of consideration in addition to other sanctions such as civil liability may
work a penalty that is "too harsh" and therefore presumably unintended by Congress.
Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 1974); Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495
F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974).
65. Two examples illustrate application of the balancing approach. Assume B con-
tracts with C for home improvements, and C takes a security interest in B's home. C
does not make full credit term disclosures and B, unversed in the English language, is
unaware that the creditor has acquired a security interest in her home. B makes timely
repayments until she becomes dissatisfied with C's faulty workmanship. B gives notice
of rescission accompanied by an offer to return the home improvements. C asserts no
defense to violations of the Act, but refuses to clear title to B's property. See Sosa v.
Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974). Here, C's refusal to clear title seems unjustified.
He asserted no good faith defense, and he was not attempting to retain necessary in-
surance of restoration, because B offered to make restoration. B, unaware that a
security interest had been taken in her home, could not have made an informed credit
decision. See note 60 supra. Thus, the need to protect B's property is great, and the
creditor's interests slight. Under these circumstances, an unconditional termination
order could be appropriate.
Now assume C takes a security interest in B's home to secure repayment of a
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al termination without provision for creditor restoration and thereby
achieve the same result as a literalist court. Generally, however, the
court's order will reflect the restorative obligations of both par-
ties. 66 It is usually necessary to order deferred restoration, because the
borrower cannot immediately repay the full amount of the loan pro-
ceeds. 67 Deferred restoration can be accomplished by either condi-
tioning termination upon the borrower's compliance with a realistic
repayment plan,68 or granting termination unconditionally and enter-
ing judgment for the creditor in the amount of the loan proceeds. 69
$12,000 loan. The first monthly installment is $60, and all others are $50. C makes
full disclosures, except that he uses the $50 per month to compute the total of pay-
ments and thereby understates the total by $10. See Ivey v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 428 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ga. 1977). B defaults. B and C agree
to avoid foreclosure by signing a new loan agreement identical to the first. B again
defaults. See LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976). C instigates fore-
closure proceedings, whereupon B rescinds, indicating that she will not repay the
loan. See Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976). When C fails to clear
title, B initiates an action to enforce § 1635(b) and also seeks civil damages under §
1640. C defends, claiming his violation was "technical." Here, it does not appear that C's
violation would be of special significance to a reasonable consumer comparison-
shopping for credit. This, combined with the fact that B rescinded only after C insti-
gated proceedings for B's failure to meet her contractual obligations, and B's indica-
tion to C that she did not intend to make restoration, would support a finding that B
was not an uninformed borrower, but was merely attempting to extricate herself
from an unwanted transaction. In addition, C's failure to clear title does not mitigate
against fulfilling the restorative purpose of § 1635(b). His defense appears to have
been made in good faith, and his fear that B would not make restitution seems legiti-
mate. Finally, the availability of civil liability seems an adequate sanction for Cs
violation, and a reasonable means to further the general goal of encouraging creditor
compliance. Here, an order of deferred restoration would be proper.
66. Courts employing the discretionist approach have great flexibility to shape
termination orders. In Ljepava v. M.L.S.C. Properties, Inc., 511 F.2d 935 (9th Cir.
1975), the district court conditioned termination upon repayment of the loan pro-
ceeds. The borrower was unable to tender fully because the cloud on title to his
property remained and he was unable to deal with the property to procure the funds
to tender restoration. The court of appeals remanded, directing the lower court to
fashion a more equitable order reflecting the rights and obligations of both parties.
Id. at 944-45.
67. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
68. Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974).
69. See, e.g., Rachbach v. Cogswell, 547 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1976) (rescis-
sion relieves the borrower of the obligation to pay finance charges, but the creditor
deserves judgment for the amount of the outstanding loan proceeds); James v. Ragin,
432 F. Supp. 887, 894 (W.D.N.C. 1977). To enter judgment produces deferred restor-
ation for the creditor because he must find an attachable asset to enforce the judgment.
If the borrower has no assets other than her interest in the subject property, restoration
may be unavailable because homestead exemptions, available in many states, will
probably prevent the judgment from attaching to the property. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE § 6.12.040 (1976) (declaration of homestead); id. § 6.12.090 (homestead ex-
empt from execution); id. § 6.12.100 (homestead subject to execution). For a discus-
sion of the protection afforded the borrower by homestead laws similar to the Wash-
ington statute, see 1975 Wis. L. REv. 192, 198-99.
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Discretionist courts reason that deferred restoration for each party
following rescission is consonant with the language and purpose of
subsections 1635(a) and (b). Subsection 1635(a) is viewed as a sub-
stantive provision granting relief in the form of rescission; subsection
1635(b) is characterized as a procedural provision detailing the me-
chanics of restoration, first for the borrower and then for the credi-
tor.70 The combined effect of these two provisions is to abrogate
contractual obligations and then to restore both parties, a result con-
sistent with traditional principles of rescission. 71 Thus, the role devel-
oped by the discretionist court is to restore both parties to the extent
possible following rescission by fashioning a remedy that parallels the
subsection 1635(b) requirements left unfulfilled by the parties. Unlike
the literalists, the discretionist court would reach a different result only
when, under the facts presented, legislative policy concerns outweigh
the mutual restorative aim of the provision.72
III. RECOMMENDING THE DISCRETIONIST APPROACH
Subsection 1635(a) allows a borrower to rescind a credit transac-
tion on grounds of material nondisclosure. 73 Thereafter, subsection
1635(b) is aimed at achieving equity between the parties by returning
each to the status quo ante. 74 The discretionist thesis advances both of
these objectives by ordering deferred restoration when full and imme-
diate restoration for both parties is not possible.75 A borrower unable
to make full repayment has an effective remedy of rescission, because
the discretionist court can protect his property from foreclosure by or-
dering repayment of the loan proceeds according to terms consistent
with his ability to repay.76 The discretionist approach is also consis-
70. For example, the court in Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1221 (4th
Cir. 1976), characterized § 1635(b) as a procedural provision.
71. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
72. See Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. La. 1975) (the
court refused to enforce restoration for the creditor, but stated that such a result
might be appropriate but for the creditor's unwillingness to refinance the money
owing).
73. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
74. See Part I-B supra.
75. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
76. The court's order can take any appropriate form. The court will consider the
borrower's finances in fashioning a termination order requiring repayment, see Palmer
v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1974), and the borrower need only comply
with the court's order to avoid enforcement of the security interest. If judgment is
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tent with the judicial approach taken to enforce any statute when the
plaintiff seeks other than money or judgment relief and Congress has
not denied the courts discretion to determine the rights of the
parties.77
Extensive reform of the Act has been widely urged.78 The need to
amend subsections 1635(a) and (b) is demonstrated by the ne-
cessity of judicial enforcement 9 and the chasm between the literalist
and discretionist interpretations. Pending reform, the assumption of
a broad discretionary judicial role allows a court to consider the cir-
cumstances surrounding the creditor's failure to clear title which result
in the breakdown of the subsection 1635(b) scheme for restoration.
Creditors may reasonably be expected to assert good faith defenses
to the borrower's act of rescission in many cases.80 A creditor with a
good faith defense should not forfeit his interest in restoration by as-
serting a right to judicial validation of the borrower's act.8 ' To so en-
force the provision does not promote the congressional goal of
strengthening competition among creditors to lower the costs of con-
sumer credit.82 On the contrary, creditors may react to what they be-
lieve is an unfair penalty by making credit more difficult to obtain
entered for the creditor, see note 69 supra, the security interest is terminated and the
borrower's property is protected by homestead exemptions.
77. Although they rarely say so explicitly, discretionist courts rely on the proposi-
tion that a court may always exercise discretion when it is requested to grant equitable
relief. In the context of § 1635(b) cases, the equitable relief sought is the termination
order which determines the restorative rights and obligations of the parties following
rescission. See Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976), wherein
the court characterized the relief sought by the rescinding borrower as equitable, and
found nothing in the statutory provisions to prevent the court from exercising its dis-
cretion to grant such equitable relief. But see id. at 1223 n.2 (Winter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that, in enforcing a statutory remedy, discre-
tion should not be invoked if it is not expressly authorized by Congress).
78. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
79. Judicial enforcement is required only when the parties do not meet the restora-
tive mandates of § 1635(b). See Part I-C supra.
80. When creditors are uncertain whether their disclosures are adequate, they
may later defend against allegations of noncompliance. The problem has been suc-
cinctly stated: "In short, the requirement of selective term disclosure and the all-is-
relevant philosophy has made compliance extremely difficult and the chance of a vio-
lation extremely high." Landers, supra note 34, at 676. See also notes 9-11 and
accompanying text supra.
81. Forfeiture would occur under the literalist approach, because its reasoning is
absolute and contains no device for measuring the fact of a good faith defense. See
Part II-A supra.
82. Senator Proxmire reasons that the net effect of the prodigious amount of liti-
gation generated by unintentional and harmless violations is to increase creditors'
costs, and that those costs are then passed on to the consumer. Proxmire Remarks,
supra note 9. See also 48 CoLo. L. REV. 437, 449 (1977).
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and increasing consumer credit charges to reflect their increased
costs. 83 The discretionist court can consider the creditor's good faith
defense in determining how to enforce restoration for the parties.8 4
Commonly, however, creditors try to retain their security interest
because they believe the borrower will not otherwise make restora-
tion. 85 This belief may be based on the assumption that the borrower is
unable to repay, or on specific indications that the borrower is hoping
to free himself from an undesirable transaction 86 without making re-
payment. Under these circumstances, the discretionist court can con-
sider the equities of the case and discourage any unwarranted
litigation by requiring the borrower to make restoration when the
creditor's violations cannot reasonably have been expected to bear on
the borrower's ability to make an informed credit decision and the
borrower seeks only to extricate himself from the contract without
making restoration.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reform of the Act should include amendment of subsection
1635(b) to provide for judicial enforcement of this restorative provi-
sion. Congress should clarify the rights and obligations of the parties
following rescission and sanction the judicial use of discretion to fash-
ion an equitable restorative order. If Congress finds, however, that the
literalist result best advances the purpose of subsection 1635(b) and the
legislative goal of promoting the informed use of consumer credit, it
should expressly preclude the use of judicial discretion by providing
that a court shall issue an unconditional termination order following
rescission. In choosing between the literalist and discretionist ap-
proaches, Congress should remain mindful that, as written, subsec-
tion 1635(b) ostensibly is aimed at assuring mutual restoration. De-
nial of judicial discretion will rob the provision of its seemingly
equitable nature and transform it into merely an enforcement device
83. Proxmire Remarks, supra note 9.
84. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
85. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
86. The court in LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976). apparently
so reasoned when the borrower twice defaulted and rescinded after the creditor began
foreclosure proceedings. See also Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1974)
(dictum) (the court stated that when the borrower has shown no willingness to make
restitution, and wants only to be freed of his obligations, the court should enforce the
borrower's obligation to make repayment).
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whereby a borrower may rescind and obtain restoration without being
required to tender back consideration received.
Janis K. Stanich
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